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CURRENT LEGISLATION
IVES-QUINN ACT-THE LAW AGAINST DISCRIMINATION.-On
March 12, 1945 the New York Legislature, on the recommendation
of the New York State Temporary Commission Against Discrimina-
tion,' amended the Executive Law.2 There was created in the exec-
utive department a commission vested with power "to eliminate and
prevent discrimination because of race, creed, color or national origin
either by employers, labor organizations, employment agencies or
other persons."
This law is an inevitable outgrowth of precursory legislation.
Man has constantly been seeking, through government and law, free-
dom, equality, security. In our country, from the Declaration of
Independence through the Constitution of the United States and con-
stitutions of the several states, has run the thread of man's search for
the affirmation of these principles. He has continually projected into
the field of social relationships the sanctions of legislation. This is
evidenced by a study of the New York laws proscribing discrimina-
tion in various situations.3
' See Report of the N. Y. State Temporary Commission Against Dis-
crimination, LEais. Doc. No. 6 (1945). The New York State War Council
was created in 1942 and since it would function, as its name implied, during
the war only, and since its work in combating discrimination against various
minorities in their efforts to find work and contribute to the national defense
had been highly successful, the New York State Temporary Commission
Against Discrimination was created in 1944 to draft legislation of a permanent
nature. Its recommendation of the "Law Against Discrimination" was approved
this year in its entirety with but one exception, and it becomes law effective
July 1, 1945.
2 Chapter 23 of the Laws of 1909 entitled "An act in relation to executive
officers constituting c. 12 of the consolidated laws" was amended by inserting
therein, a new article, to be Article 12, entitled "State Commission Against
Discrimination." Former Article 12 is renumbered 12a.
3 By the Consolidated Laws of 1909, discrimination because of race, creed
or color in jury service, in the right to practice law, in admission to the public
schools, or in places of public accommodation, resort or amusement was for-
bidden. (N. Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW §§ 13, 40, 41; N. Y. JUDIc. LAW § 467;
N. Y. EDuC. LAW § 920.) From 1913 to 1938, the following were proscribed:
discrimination in insurance rates and benefits as between white and colored
persons (N. Y. PeN. LAW [1913] § 1191) ; discrimination because of race, color
or creed in any public employment, or in any accommodation by innkeepers,
common carriers or operators of amusement places, or by teachers or officers
of public institutions of learning, or by cemetery associations (N. Y. PEN. LAW
[1918] § 514); inquiry concerning religion or religious affiliation of any person
seeking employment or official position in public schools (N. Y. Civ. RIGHTS
LAW [1932] § 40-a); discrimination by utility companies in employment on
account of race, color or religion (N. Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW [1933] § 42) ; public
contracts which did not contain a clause against discrimination in em-
ployment because of race or color (N. Y. LABOR LAW [1935] §220-e); tax
exemption to any education corporation or association which held itself out as
non-sectarian but denied its facilities to any person because of race, color or
religion (N. Y. TAx LAW [1935] § 4, subd. 6). From 1938 to the present, the
tempo in such legislation quickened. In 1938, with not a single state constitu-
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The general purpose of the new law is the elimination and pre-
vention of discrimination in employment,4 and the opportunity for
employment without discrimination is declared to be a civil right.5
The terms "employer" and "employee" have been strictly defined in
the law 6 for, in the opinion of those who drafted the law, to have
tion containing any provision seeking to prohibit discrimination on the part of
individuals, firms or corporations upon social or religious grounds, a constitu-
tional provision against discrimination was added to the bill of rights, as
follows: "Equal protection of laws; discrimination in civil rights prohibited.
§ 11. . . . No person shall because of race, color, creed or religion be subjected
to any discrimination in his civil rights by any other person or by any firm,
corporation, or institution, or by the state or any agency or subdivision of the
state" (N. Y. CoNsr. [1938] Art. I, § 11). The debates in the state constitu-
tional convention show that uppermost in its conception of "civil rights" was
the right to justice in the field of employment. In 1939, the state forbade
discrimination because of race, creed, color or religion under the public housing
law (N. Y. Pui. HOUSING LAW § 223). In 1940, labor organizations were
forbidden to deny membership or equal treatment because of race, color or
creed; deprivation of public relief or work because of any such discrimination
was also forbidden (N. Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW § 43; PEN. LAW § 172a). In
1941, the state forbade any offense against Section 11 of the Bill of Rights and
made it a misdemeanor (PEN. LAW §§ 700, 701); that same year, industries
involved in defense contracts were forbidden to discriminate in employment
because of race, color, creed or national origin (N. Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW § 44;
N. Y. PEN. LAW § 514). In 1942, the Industrial Commissioner was empow-
ered to "enforce" the provisions of Sections 42, 43 and 44 of the Civil Rights
Law, but the Act gives no means of enforcement other than the power of
investigation, subpoena, and hearing as vested in him by the Labor Law (N. Y.
Civ. RIGHTS LAW § 45). In 1943, discrimination in the sale or delivery of
alcoholic beverages was proscribed (N. Y. ALco. BEv. CONT. LAW § 65).
4 Sec. 125: ". . . and the legislature finds and declares that practices of
discrimination against any of its inhabitants because of race, creed, color or
national origin are a matter of state concern, that such discrimination threatens
not only the rights and proper privileges of its inhabitants but menaces the
institutions and foundations of a free democratic state."
5 Bouvier says that "civil rights . . . may be reduced to three principal or
primary articles: the right of personal security, which consists in a person's
legal and uninterrupted enjoyment of. his life, his limbs, his body, his health,
and reputation; the right of personal liberty, which consists in the power of
locomotion, of changing situation or removing one's person to whatsoever place
one's inclination may direct without any restraint unless by due course of law;
the right of property, which consists in the free use, enjoyment, and disposal
of all his acquisitions, without any control or diminution save only by the laws
of the land... ." BOUVIER, LAW DIcT., "Right", p. 929.
In the case of Carroll v. Local 269, 133 N. J. Eq. 144, 146, 31 A. (2d)
223 (1943), the court said, "the right to earn a livelihood is a property right
which is guaranteed in our country by the fifth and fourteenth amendments of
the federal constitution and by the state constitution. Denial or curtailment
of the right to work by reason of race, creed, color or national origin deprives
minorities of their constitutional right to earn a livelihood."
6 Sec. 127. The term "employer" does not include a club exclusively so-
cial, or a fraternal, charitable, educational or religious association or corpora-
tion, if such club, association or corporation is not organized for private profit,
nor does it include any employer with fewer than six persons in his employ.
The term "employee" does not include any individual employed by his parents,
spouse, or child or in the domestic service of any person.
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attempted fuller inclusion was to have aroused resentment, risked
constitutional inhibitions and to have been most unwise in this, the
initial, stage. In any event the door is left open to further legisla-
tion, in the light of experience and future developments, by the power
given the permanent state agency to make recommendations to the
legislature. Of course, future legislatures may not desire to go
further. The results of the administration of this law will have much
to do with shaping future policy.
The law provides for the creation of a state commission, con-
sisting of five commissioners appointed to a five-year term of office,
at a salary to each of $10,000 a year. There is provision for removal
by the governor upon grounds stated in writing. The commissioners
are not required to devote their full time to their duties, a departure
from the recommendation of the Temporary State Commission. This
departure is to be regretted. The powers and duties given to this
administrative body illustrate the broad scope of the job. To meet
it by calling for a part-time devotion to duty is unwise, impractical.
An analysis of the commission's powers will show how important it
is that its personnel realize the full impact of this social, economic
and legal program.
The commission is given broad powers to formulate policies for
the state in the field of discrimination, subject to the legislature's
approval.7 It is, more specifically, to receive, investigate and pass
upon complaints alleging discrimination in employment because of
race, creed, color or national origin. One of the most sweeping pow-
ers, and, incidentally, one on which most people are in accord, is
that given the commission to create advisory agencies and concilia-
tion councils, local, regional or state-wide, as in its judgment will aid
in effectuating the purposes of this law. The commission may em-
power them to study the problems of discrimination in all or specific
fields of human relationships or in specific instances of discrimina-
tion, and to foster, through community effort or otherwise, goodwill,
cooperation and conciliation among the groups and elements of the
population of the state, and make recommendations to the commis-
sion for the development of policies and procedures and for programs
of formal and informal education. These bodies are to be composed
of citizens serving without pay. Insofar as it is recognized that
harmonious social relationships cannot be imposed by legislative fiat,
the soundness of this provision is immeasurable. In essence, it calls
for community effort with an enlightened guidance from various re-
sponsible civic leaders and groups. This is a challenge to the people
of this state upon whom, ultimately, must rest the responsibility for
7 It is given power to hold hearings, subpoena witnesses and records, and
no person shall be excused from attending and testifying or from producing
records or other evidence on the ground that he may be incriminating himself.
However, immunity from prosecution is extended because of such testimony,
although the immunity is confined to the natural versons so compelled to
testify. § 130.
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the success or failure of this legislative program.
The law defines unlawful employment practices,8 outlines the
broad administrative procedure to be followed by the commission,
provides for judicial review and enforcement, and contains penal
provisions. Any person who is instrumental in the doing of any of
the acts forbidden is guilty of an unlawful employment practice and
thereby comes within the purview of the statute.
The procedure itself is rather simple. Any aggrieved person
may by himself or by his attorney make, sign and file with the com-
mission a verified complaint in writing, stating the name and address
of the person alleged to have committed the unlawful employment
practice, setting forth the particulars thereof and such other informa-
tion as the commission may require. The industrial commissioner
or attorney general may in like manner make, sign and file such
complaint. An employer may also file a complaint where his em-
ployee or employees refuse to cooperate with this law. After the
filing of a complaint, the chairman of the commission is to designate
a member thereof to make an investigation. If the commissioner
finds that probable cause exists for crediting the allegations of the
complaint, he is to try to eliminate the unlawful employment practice
by conference, conciliation and perusasion. This is important be-
cause success here means sound administrative practice. It is hoped
that most of the conflicts will here be resolved, and that the opposing
parties will be left on amicable terms, with better understanding of,
and respect for, each other's rights.
If this fails, a hearing is had in accordance with the procedure
set forth in the law.9  If the commission finds the existence of an
unlawful employment practice, it shall state its finding of fact and
issue an order on the respondent to cease and desist from such prac-
tice. It shall, furthermore, be able to take such affirmative action as
hiring, reinstatement or upgrading of employees with or without back
8 Sec. 131. An employer who refuses to hire or employ or who bars or
discharges from employment or who discriminates in compensation or in terms,
conditions or privileges of employment because of race, creed, color or national
origin is guilty of an unlawful employment practice. It is unlawful for a labor
organization to exclude or expel from its membership any individual for such
reasons and it may not discrimin'ate in any way against any of its members or
against any employer. It is unlawful for an employment agency to print or
circulate or cause to be printed or circulated any statement, advertisement or
publication, or to use any form of application for employment or to make any
inquiry in connection with prospective employment which expresses directly or
indirectly any limitation, specification, or discrimination as to race, creed, color
or national origin unless based upon a bona fide occupational qualification.
9 The commissioner shall cause to be issued in the name of the commission
a written notice to be served with a copy of the complaint requiring the person
named therein, referred to as "respondent", to answer the charges at a hearing
before three members of the commission sitting as the commission at a time
and place to be specified in the notice. The investigating commissioner is not
to participate in the hearing except as a witness, nor may he participate in the
deliberation of the commission in such case. The strict rules of evidence are
not to apply.
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pay, restoring to membership in the labor union. By giving the
commission this real power, the state has put "teeth" into the law.
If no unlawful employment practice is found to exist, an order dis-
missing the complaint shall be issued.
A short statute of limitations as to the filing of a complaint has
been set at ninety days. This is sound in view of the affirmative
power to order the payment of back pay. Any party claiming to be
aggrieved by an order of the commission may obtain judicial review,10
and the commission in turn may obtain an order of court for its
enforcement. Proceedings of this nature shall take precedence over
other cases pending in the court, and the spirit of the legislation war-
rants speedy action and quick relief." There is a provision that the
law is to be liberally construed and that it is not intended to repeal
any provisions of the New York Civil Rights Law or of other laws.
While a proceeding is pending as to any unlawful employment prac-
tice, it shall be exclusive and a final determination therein shall
exclude any other action, civil or criminal, based on the same griev-
ance. If an action is instituted without resorting to the procedure
of this law, resort to this procedure may not subsequently be had.
The law has been criticized on the grounds that it is too proce-
dural and that it will prove too much of an administrative expense.
The first argument may be met by pointing out that the goal set is
that of re-educating our citizens to the meaning of democracy. The
problem is not a simple one, and legislation alone is not the solution.
It is hoped that only in isolated cases, where the offense is flagrant,
will there be the need of going through the entire procedure. The
emphasis should not be on the penal aspect, though there is provision
for it, but rather on "persuasion, conference, conciliation".
As far as the expense involved, it has been urged that the admin-
istration of the law could have been assigned to an already existing
agency,' 2 such as the New York State Department of Labor, at a
10 Such proceeding shall be brought in the Supreme Court of the state, and
an appeal may be taken to the Appellate Division and the Court of Appeals.
An objection that has not been urged before the commission cannot be con-
sidered by the court except under extraordinary circumstances. The findings
of the commission as to facts shall be conclusive if supported by sufficient
evidence on the record considered as a whole.
1 A proceeding for judicial review must be instituted- within thirty days
after the service of the commission's order by the party aggrieved. Anyone
who wilfully resists or interferes with the commission in the performance of
duty or who wilfully violates an order of the commission shall be guilty of a
misdemeanor. The penalty provided is a prison term in the penitentiary or
county jail for not more than one year or a fine of not more than $500 or both.
However, the procedure for review of order is not to be deemed wilful
conduct. § 132.
12 It is interesting to note that the fair employment practices bill passed by
the New Jersey legislature and sent to the governor for signature, where it
still is at the time this is written, places the enforcement of the anti-discrimina-
tion provisions with a state agency-the Education Department. This bill bans
bias by employers of six or more persons and by labor unions, but it requires
indictment by a grand jury before a violator can be convicted of discrimina-
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saving to the state. There is merit in this criticism in view of the
fact that the commissioners appointed to administer the law are not
required to devote their full time to the job. It was felt, however,
that the problem warranted the creation of a separate, independent
agency, for the problem is not merely that of labor, capital, or of any
specific minority. It is uniquely common to all who envisage a work-
able democracy. The commission is charged with the duty of acting
in furtherance of the general welfare. It was also for this reason
that membership on the commission was not apportioned among the
various economic or other groups. It is also the hope that those
attracted to the administration of this law will be people willing to
devote to it their full time and energy.
A further objection was that the law should have required the
posting of a bond by complainants which, it was argued, would have
eliminated nuisance suits. The exclusion of such a requirement is
commendable for it would have served to frighten away the poor and
timorous, those whom the law seeks to protect. If any complaints
are in the nature of nuisances, it is up to the commission to ferret
them out, and dismiss them rapidly.
The constitutional questions involved, in this writer's opinion,
appear fairly to be resolved in favor of the law's validity. 8 As stated
in the law itself, it is an exercise of the state's police power for the
protection of the public welfare, health and peace of the people of
this state. The peace and economic prosperity of its people are of
state concern and do not strain the concept of police power. That
the state has power to classify as it has done, that is, extend its pro-
tective aegis over specified types of employment situations, cannot be
gainsaid at this stage in our history. Classification which is reason-
able is constitutional.1 4 There is here, furthermore, no abhorrent
invasion of the right to employ and to contract. Freedom of contract
is not absolute. The Supreme Court of the United States has held
that "the constitution does not guarantee the unrestricted privilege
to engage in a business or to conduct it as one pleases." '5 And in
another case the United States Supreme Court, through Chief Justice
Hughes, said, "what is this freedom of contract? The Constitution
does not speak of freedom of contract. It speaks of liberty and pro-
tion. This last provision indicates the weakness of the bill, since indictment
and trial consume far too much time. Moreover, the New Jersey State Board
of Education, several hours before the legislature passed the bill, passed a
resolution stating the plan would interfere with educational administration in
the state. In short, it did not want the job. Incidentally, eight states have had
legislation in some respects similar to the New York Ives-Quinn Act proposed
in their legislature. They are: N. J., Mass., Conn., Pa., Ill., Calif., Ind., and
Ohio.
13 Sec. 136 provides that if any part of the law is declared unconstitutional,
it shall not invalidate the rest of the law-the usual separability clause.24 Radice v. New York, 264 U. S. 292, 44 Sup. Ct. 325 (1924).
25 Nebbia v. People of the State of New York, 291 U. S. 502, 527, 54 Sup.
Ct. 505 (1934).
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hibits the deprivation of liberty without due process of law. In pro-
hibiting that deprivation the Constitution does not recognize an abso-
lute and uncontrollable liberty. Liberty in each of its phases has its
history and connotation. But the liberty safeguarded is liberty in a
social organization which requires the protection of law against the
evils which menace the health, safety, morals and welfare of the
people. Liberty under the Constitution is thus necessarily subject
to the restraints of due process, and regulation which is reasonable
in relation to its subject and is adopted in the interests of the com-
munity is due process. This essential limitation of liberty in general
governs freedom of contract in particular." 16
TERRY LICHTASH.
VOLUNTARY ADOPTION BY THOSE IN MILITARY SERvIE.-The
legislature of the State of New York has demonstrated a definite
policy of aiding those away from home on active duty in the armed
forces, by enacting laws facilitating procedure relative to their legal
status.' In keeping with this general ,policy, the legislature has
recently amended the Domestic Relations Law dealing with voluntary
adoptions, facilitating thereby adoptions by those persons on active
duty in the armed forces of the United States.2
Although the concept of adoption is rooted essentially in the
concept of charity, it was known as a legal status only to some of the
continental systems of law, and primarily in the French and Spanish
law, but it was unknown to the English common law.3 As a result,
therefore, the whole modern concept in our law is purely one of
statutory regulation.4 Since it is a legislative creature, the legisla-
ture retains the power to create, destroy, and to limit the privilege of
adoption.5 Having the power to regulate the privilege, the legisla-
ture has been reluctant, in the past, to treat adopted children in the
same manner as natural children. In the first general enactment of
the subject of adoption into New York law,6 the adopted child was
permitted to assume all the relationships of a natural child, but the
law expressly excluded the right of inheritance. 7 In 1887, however,
16 West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U. S. 379, 391, 57 Sup. Ct. 578
(1937).
1 SOLDIERS AND SAILORS Civ. REL. AcT OF 1940, N. Y. Laws 1941, c. 686;
Survival of Power of Attorney After Death of Donor, N. Y. MuLir. LAW
§ 317a.
2 N. Y. DoM. REr. LAW § 112, pars. 1 and 5 as amended by L. 1945, c. 98.
3 United States Trust Co. v. Hoyt, 150 App. Div. 621, 135 N. Y. Supp.
849 (1st Dep't 1912).
4 Carpenter v. Buffalo General Electric Co., 213 N. Y. 101, 106 N. E. 1026(1914).
5In re Pierro, 173 Misc. 123, 17 N. Y. S. (2d) 233 (1940).
6 L. 1873, c. 830, § 10.
7 Ibid.
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